Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Jun 1st 2009, aircraft impacted ocean
By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Feb 4th 2011 14:09Z, last updated Monday, Apr 4th 2011 16:10Z
Today (Feb 4th 2011) the French BEA have disclosed details of the 4th search phase for the wreckage and black
boxes of flight AF-447, which is going to start March 15th 2011 and last until July 2011 in three stages of 36 days
(30 days search, 6 days transit for stop overs in Brazil) each. Three submarines (Remus 6000) are being used
together with their exploration vessel «Alucia». This phase is dedicated to locate debris and the black boxes, uses
small ships and is less expensive (9.3 Million Euros/12.5 Million US$) being funded by Airbus and Air France.
Should phase 4 locate the wreckage, the BEA will immediately trigger phase 5 which is to recover the located
wreckage. This phase is deemed expensive and will be funded by the state.
Phase 4 is going to search an area of 10,000 square kilometers following 7,000 square kilometers being covered in
the previous three search phases, so that the complete area of 40nm around the last known position of flight Air
France AF-447 (17,000 square kilometers/5,000 square nm) will be covered.
On Apr 3rd 2011 investigators of the BEA said, that in the last 24 hours debris has been recovered from the
Atlantic Ocean floor which has been identified to belong to the crashed Airbus A330-200 registration F-GZCP.
The debris was «relatively concentrated», investigators now believe they have located the actual main wreckage
site. There is still no guarantee though that the flight data recorders will be found. More information will be
released in a press conference in Paris on Apr 4th 15:00L (13:00Z).
In the press conference of Apr 4th the BEA released a number of graphics and photos (see below) showing the
location of the main wreckage site as well as some underwater pictures of the debris found.
The BEA denied widespread media reports surfacing during May 6th, that the black boxes were found or located. The BEA
said instead late May 6th, that data analysis of recordings taken during the first phase of search within 4 weeks after the crash
has identified a zone of possibility spreading over an area of a few tens of square kilometers. That zone is located about 2 ship
hours south of the locations searched so far. The search is now expanding into that zone of possibility as well.
The false media reports were based on a statement by a French deputy minister early May 6th 2010, that the black boxes
have been found. The deputy minister adjusted his statement during the day that the black boxes had been located to an
accuracy of 5km.
The Aviation Herald never believed that report arguing, that it was highly unlikely the black boxes were located at a time when
the ships were in Recife (Brazil) for recrewing, resupplying and reorganisation of the search (BEA statement released May 4th
2010), and also arguing, that if the black boxes no longer sending any signals were found, underwater robot equipment must
actually have established visual contact, so that not knowing the coordinates with a precision of a few meters would be
incomprehensible.
On May 12th the BEA reported, that the search in the zone of possibility did not turn up anything. The searchers have
returned to the original search area.
On Jun 10th the BEA said, that the third phase of search has ended on May 24th without locating the wreckage or black boxes
of the aircraft. 6300 square kilometers of search area had been combed in that third phase of search bringing the total of
surveyed area close to 17000 square kilometers. The BEA is currently evaluating the results of the three phases of search.
The French BEA have released their second English
interim report adding new information regarding the
wreckage parts recovered, weather situation, the decoding
of ACARS messages, certification and continuing
airworthiness of the pitot probes as well as about other
events with unreliable airspeed.
All materials recovered so far were made of low density
honeycomb or composite materials and include the
radome, parts of the cabin, cargo compartment, wing, belly
fairing and lower deck mobile crew rest. Most of the debris
could be located according to its position in the aircraft
using serial numbers or comparism according to shape,
coating color, materials and documentation of the
manufacturer where serial numbers were not available.
The life jackets recovered were all in their packages.
29 passenger oxygen containers were found in the debris.
Deformations on three damaged showed, that they were in
their non-deployed position. Other less damaged
containers although open had their pins still in place, which close the oxygen circuit, showing the oxygen flow had not been
activated.
Recovered control surfaces include some aileron parts and some elevator parts, all of which show damages caused by a
bottom-upward load.
Parts of the flap track fairings enabled analysis showing, that the flaps were in their retracted position.
Analysis of the rudder damage show, that the rudder’s hinge axis experienced a relative load of more than 36G relative to the
vertical stabilizer.
The seat belts of the cabin crew seats were not used at time of impact.
All damages were symmetric, no lateral forces became evident through the damages. All debris shows evidence of a high rate
of descent at the time of impact with the water. The damages are not compatible with a separation of the aft part of the
fuselage in flight. The left/right symmetry indicates, that the airplane had little bank/sideslip at impact. The damages are not
consistent with a nose low attitude at time of impact.
The BEA concludes from the damages, that the airplane was probably intact at the time of impact with the water, the airplane
struck the water with a nose up attitude, low bank and a high rate of descent.
Autopsies were performed on 50 bodies, 45 passengers, 4 flight attendants and the captain. All injuries, mainly fractures of the
spinal column, are compatible with a high upwards acceleration on a seated person. The autopsy of the captain does not
allow a conclusion to the location of the captain at the time of impact.
Explanation of ACARS messages:
NAV TCAS FAULT:
The NAV TCAS Fault message is only compatible with one mode, in which an internal TCAS monitoring process which applies
to the altitude parameter. The active transponder’s altitude information (received from air data reference ADR 1 or ADR 2) is
subjected to a credibility test, in which TCAS computes an altitude prediction and compares it with the actual altitude. If the
two parameters move too far apart, TCAS stops operating and generates this specific ECAM message. Once the altitude
becomes credible again, TCAS would resume operation.
PFD FPV flags:
The flight path vectors FPV would be completely removed from the captain’s and first officer’s primary flight displays only if one
of the three conditions are met for each of the three air data references:
– barometric vertical speed higher than 20,000 feet per minute
– true airspeed higher than 599 knots
– measured calibrated airspeed is less than 60 knots
Once the parameters come within normal operating ranges again, the FPV indications would resume.
F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT:
The message indicates, that the flight control master computer 1 has stopped working either as result of a command or as a
result of a failure. In the absense of an associated fault message, it is not possible to command a shut down. A fault message
can not be excluded, it might have been still queued for transmission, but could not be sent anymore.
F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT:
Same as F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT, however associated to flight controls secondary control computer.
Maintenance Status ADR2:
Three possible fault messages concern a monitoring process checking the coherance of static pressure, total pressure and
angle of attack delivered by the three ADRs. in the case of ADR2 one of these monitoring processes has detected a deviation
greater than a preset threshold between its own parameters and those of ADR1 and ADR3.
ISIS (22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION:
The only possibilities of excursion of the envelope consistent with the other messages has been identified to be:
– a calibrated airspeed higher than 530 knots without Mach exceeding 1.0. This condition implies, that the aircraft was
between 4000 and 14000 feet.
Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Jun 1st 2009, aircraft impacted ocean 06/04/11 20:40
http://avherald.com/h?article=41a81ef1/0053&opt=0 Página 8 de 32
– the difference between total and static pressure being lower than a given threshold. Notably this includes the case that the
static pressure is higher than the total pressure.
The «HARD» nature of the message indicates, that the condition existed for longer than 2 seconds.
ADIRU2 (1FP2):
This message was created by IR2 (Inertial Reference Unit 2) indicating, that it considered all three ADRs invalid with at least
one parameter (barometric altitude, barometric vertical speed and true airspeed) being inconsistent. It is logical, that as soon
as one IR produced that fault message upon rejecting the third ADR, the other two IRs would produce such a message, too.
The fact, that EFCS1 was amongst the identifiers, permits to state that at least two primary flight control computers rejected
the ADRs. It has not been possible yet to understand, why EFCS2 – the clone of EFCS1 – was not amongst the identifiers.
The analysis of the fault messages:
At least one message must have been pending for transmission at the time of impact. That message should have been
transmitted at 02:15:14 UTC at the very latest, but was not transmitted.
According to the attitude information derived from the debris the airplane was in a nose up almost wing level attitude and
therefore should have been able to transmit ACARS messages to the very last second of flight. This would suggest an end of
flight between 02:14:26Z and 02:15:14Z.
The preliminary analysis highlights an inconsistency in the speeds measured just after 02:10Z, which generated 10 of the 24
messages in that minute. 11 other messages between 02:11 and 02:14 can also be linked anemometric problems like speed
inconsistencies, low speed or erratic speed values.
The airplane switched to Alternate Law at 02:10Z and remained in that law until end of flight.
No message indicates the loss of displays or inertial information (attitudes).
The BEA annotates, that the messages show significant differences to flight QF-72 in both content and sequence. QF72
experienced problems with the ADIRU, see Accident: Qantas A333 near Learmonth on Oct 7th 2008, sudden inflight
upset injures 74 people on board.
The BEA studied 13 cases of losses or temporary anomalies of speeds. Several notable points were derived:
– all flight levels were between 340 and 390
– the air masses were highly unstable and were the seat of deep convection phenomena
– the crews reported no significant radar echos on the chosen flight path, however observed active zones nearby or lower. A
study by Meteo France is being conducted on this on request by BEA.
– three crews reported observing ice or rain.
– all events occured in instrument meteorological conditions.
– the recordings of total or static temperature show increases of 10 to 20 degrees C which sometimes began before the crew
noticed speed anomalies (in one event the increase was lower).
– turbulence was always recorded and observed, levels reported by crews varying from light to severe. The recorded
minimum/maximum accelerations ranged from 0.75-1.2G to 0.2-1.9G.
In all cases:
– the autopilot disengaged without crew intervention
– the crews were able to use autoflight systems (autopilot, autothrust) again
– in 12 cases the airplane switched to alternate law until end of flight
– the autopilot disconnection was associated with the removal of flight director indications and sometimes other parameters, in
all cases the flight director reappeared during the event, in some cases when two speed values were recorded coming close
again
– in seven cases the autopilot reconnected during the event, in two cases when the speed values were close to each other
but erroneous
– the autothrust disconnected in 10 cases resulting in thrust lock activation. In five cases the ThrustLock function remained
active for over one minute.
– in two cases the autothrust did not reconnect and the flight director did not reappear. The recording of engine RPM N1
parameters showed fluctuations between 48 and100%.
– the speed anomalies can be categorized as intermittent falls (peaks) and falls followed by levelling off, that were
accompanied by an instant increase in dispayed static temperature and a «drop» in altitudes. In two cases the lower speed
limits recorded were below 100 KIAS.
– the maximum continuous duration of anomalies was 3 minutes 20 seconds.
– when the speeds of the ISIS systems were recorded, their anomalies possessed signatures that were different from the
indications on the captain’s instruments.
Crew reactions to the reappearance of the flight directors on the PFD include the rapid reengagement of the autopilot
and autothrust systems. While the speeds may be close to each other, they may be erroneous however leading the
autoflight systems to command movements of the flight control surfaces that may be inappropriate for the real speed
of the airplane. (Editorial note: bold set by the editor, who thinks this may be a very significant sentence in the report, page
53 top paragraph).
In case of an automatic disconnection of the autothrust system with activation of the ThrustLock Function, the
absense of manual adjustment by crew can present a risk of an attitude/thrust mismatch especially if the disconnect
occured at a low N1 value. (Editorial Note: bold added by the editor, this sentence may be significant, page 53 second
paragraph).
By November 3rd Airbus has identified 32 cases of erroneous air speed indications between Nov 12th 2003 and Jun 1st 2009.
2 of the events were the result of pitot probe obstruction/possible destruction by ice. 11 events happened in 2008 and 10 in
the first 5 months of 2009. In 26 cases the aircraft was equipped with AA Thales probes, in two cases with BA Thales probes
and in one case with a Goodrich probe.
All Air France Airbusses A330s were initially equipped with Goodrich 0851GR probes. Following a number of speed fluctuation
events or speed indication losses the French DGAC published an airworthiness directive in 2001 which demanded the
replacement of the Goodrich 0851GR probe with either the Thales probes or the Goodrich 0851HL probe before the end of
2003. In accordance with that AD Air France equipped their A340 and A330 fleet with the AA Thales probes.
Following speed inconsistencies in heavy precipitation or icing conditions on A320s and other types Airbus published a nonmandatory
Service Bulletin recommending the replacement of the Thales AA probes with the BA type. In absence of observed
speed inconsistencies Air France chose to apply the Service Bulletin only in case of pitot failure.
Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Jun 1st 2009, aircraft impacted ocean 06/04/11 20:40
http://avherald.com/h?article=41a81ef1/0053&opt=0 Página 9 de 32
In September 2008 Air France had observed a number of speed inconsistencies and approached Airbus asking, whether the
BA type would resolve this inconsistencies, but received the reply, that the BA type would improve performance in heavy
precipitation but not with ice crystals. In October 2008 Air France alerted Thales of the increasing problem of probe icing
prompting Thales to open an internal technical analysis.
On Nov 12th Airbus modified their Service Bulletin removing the mention of ice crystals.
New meteorological analysis shows the presence of strong condensation towards AF-447’s flight level probably associated
with convection phenomena. The precise composition of cloud masses above FL300 is little known, especially with regards to
super-cooled water/ice crystal diving, especially with regards to the size of the latter.
Several airplanes flying before or after AF-447 at about the same altitude altered their course to avoid the cloud
masses. (Editorial note: bold added, may prove significant)
By Simon Hradecky, created Sunday, Nov 8th 2009 17:13Z, last updated Sunday, Nov 8th 2009 17:15Z
In a memorial held in Rio de Janeiro France’s Minister of State for Cooperation said, that the third phase of search for the
black boxes will commence in February 2010.
By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Aug 21st 2009 10:02Z, last updated Friday, Aug 21st 2009 10:02Z
The French BEA said in a press release, that the second phase of search for the black boxes has ended, the oceanographic
vessel «Pourquoi pas?» is expected back in Dakar (Senegal).
The search surveyed an area of 75km in diameter around the last known position of the aircraft (N02.98 W30.59) thus covering
an area of about 18000 square kilometers (5250 square nautical miles). The search did not find the remains of the aircraft or
the black boxes.
A third phase of the search will commence in the coming weeks following a meeting between BEA, investigators and specialists
analysing available data thus far.
Airbus had pledged to invest up to 20 million Euros into the search for the black boxes if the need arises enabling this third
phase of search to last for three months.
By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Jul 31st 2009 13:50Z, last updated Friday, Jul 31st 2009 16:56Z
Airbus Industries have decided to invest up to 20 million Euros (US$ 27.8 million) into the search for the black boxes of the
crashed Air France Airbus, the company announced on Friday (Jul 31st). This will ensure at minimum an additional three
months of search for the missing recorders. Airbus said, that they want to definitely know what happened.
Airbus Industries had released a recommendation to all operators of Airbus aircraft yesterday (Jul 30th), that all A320, A330 and
A340 aircraft should be equipped with at least two Goodrich rather than Thales pitot probes following a new incident, during
which an Airbus A320-200 equipped with the improved Thales probes lost airspeed information for about one minute, see:
Incident: Air France A320 enroute on Jul 13th 2009, unreliable airspeed for one minute.
Air France have announced, that they are going to follow the recommendation by Airbus and replace the Thales with the
Goodrich pitot sensors on their aircraft.
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) announced on Friday (Jul 31st) to make the recommendation by Airbus
Industries mandatory shortly.
By Simon Hradecky, created Saturday, Jul 18th 2009 15:04Z, last updated Saturday, Jul 18th 2009 15:04Z
A 10 meter (30 feet) long piece of debris thought to belong to the fuselage of the Air France Airbus A330-200 has been found
at the beaches of Gyuana (main city Georgetown) about 1650nm westnorthwest of the last known position of the aircraft by a
fisherman on Wednesday (Jul 15th), a spokeswoman for Guyana’s Civil Aviation Authority reported.
However, the part may also belong to an Ariane space rocket, that was launched in French Guyana on July 1st.
Map (Courtesy Google Earth):
Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Jun 1st 2009, aircraft impacted ocean 06/04/11 20:40
http://avherald.com/h?article=41a81ef1/0053&opt=0 Página 10 de 32
By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Jul 15th 2009 15:14Z, last updated Wednesday, Jul 15th 2009 15:16Z
The French BEA announced, that the search for the wreckage and flight data recorders on the ocean floor will continue with
the help of the oceanographic vessel «Pourquoi pas?», that is going to join the search next week. This phase of the search is
scheduled to last for another month and involves diving vehicles and a towed sonar.
The debris parts collected from the ocean so far have reached France and are now being examined by the BEA.
By Simon Hradecky, created Saturday, Jul 4th 2009 08:33Z, last updated Wednesday, Jul 8th 2009 11:01Z
In response to the report put forward by the French BEA and aiming to remove doubts about procedures adopted by Brazil’s
Civil Aviation Authority Brazil’s Air Media Center clarified, that a flight plan was provided by the airline to all relevant air traffic
control centers along the flight path of the airplane (the BEA had reported Dakar was not in possession of a flight plan).
At 01:33Z flight AF-447 did forward an estimate of 02:20Z for waypoint TASIL (the BEA states in their report, that that estimate
was not provided despite three repeated requests by Brazil’s Atlantic control). The position estimates were immediately phoned
to Dakar ATC, the receipt of the estimates were acknowledged by Dakar (the BEA states, that Dakar requested such data at
01:48Z as they did not have a flightplan).
The FAB also states, that Recife Control issued alert at 05:40Z (the BEA reported, alert was issued by Brest Control Center at
08:15Z) and started the search for the airplane following the inquiry of Dakar about AF-447s position at 04:40Z, with sun rise
the first search airplane was already in the air overflying the route that AF-447 had been following for a visual search.
At no time any ELT signals or distress calls (including on the international emergency frequency) were recorded.
According to operational agreements between Brazil and Senegal there is no need to have a formal communication between
the air traffic control centers to transfer the airplane from one control zone to the other, if the airplane is to overfly the control
zone boundaries within 3 minutes of its coordinated estimate. There was no formal transfer of AF-447 therefore, starting 02:20Z
the airplane was (theoretically) under the control of Dakar.
On Jul 8th The Aviation Herald received additional information to a possibly related incident. The information states, that data
collected by Delta Airlines since 2006 support the theory of blockages of the pitot tubes rather than icing. About 1 in 83,300
flights have been affected by unreliable airspeed encounters since 2006, all events occuring between FL330 and FL400 in
moderate or stronger turbulence. All events took place between May and December (none between December and May) and
all events took place on latitudes between 3 degrees North and 37 degrees North. See: Incident: Northwest A333 over East
China Sea on Jun 23rd 2009, unreliable airspeed.
By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Jul 2nd 2009 16:37Z, last updated Thursday, Jul 2nd 2009 19:12Z
The BEA have released their preliminary reports in both English (3MB – without attachments) and French (13MB) reporting,
that the airplane had taken off from Rio de Janeiro at 232.8 tons near its maximum takeoff weight (233 tons) at 22:29Z. The
airplane was subsequently cleared to FL350. At 01:35Z the crew contacted Brazil’s Atlantic air traffic control control on the HF
frequency reporting, they had just overflown waypoint INTOL, giving estimates for waypoints SALPU at 01:48Z and ORARO at
02:00Z. The crew also transmitted their SELCAL code and a test was performed.
The controller subsequently asked them to maintain FL350 and provide an estimate for TASIL, repeating the request for three
times without reply.
The airplane’s ACARS was programmed to transmit its own position about every 10 minutes. The last position transmitted at
02:10Z was 02 degrees 58.8 minutes North and 30 degrees 35.4 minutes West (N02.98 W30.59).
Analysis of the weather infrared images produced by the Meteosat 9 satellite every 15 minutes, with an image taken about 7
minutes before and another 7 minutes taken after the last position report at 02:10Z, does not allow conclusions, that the
weather was exceptional, but shows the existance of a cluster of powerful cumulonimbi along the planned flight path starting at
Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Jun 1st 2009, aircraft impacted ocean 06/04/11 20:40
http://avherald.com/h?article=41a81ef1/0053&opt=0 Página 11 de 32
00:30Z. The cluster is the result of 4 smaller clusters combining, its east-west extension was some 400km (216nm). By around
02:00Z those cumulonimbi had reached their maturity, it is therefore highly probable that some produced notable turbulence at
FL350. It is also possible, that there was significant electrical activity at that flight level. The existance of supercooled water
however is not very probable.
Dakar Air Traffic Control requested information about flight AF-447 from Brazil’s Atlantic Control by phone on 01:48Z as he had
no flight plan, and later coordinated the airplane with Cape Verde Control. He told Cape Verde at 02:48Z, that he had not
made contact with AF-447. At 04:21Z Dakar asked Brazil’s Atlantic control by phone to confirm, that the airplane had passed
TASIL. Brazil confirmed that the airplane was estimated TASIL at 02:20Z at FL350, but no contact was made. Dakar computed
an estimate of 03:45Z for entering the airspace of Cape Verde, but Cape Verde reported at 04:39, that no contact had been
made. At 05:09Z Brazil’s Atlantic Control had rechecked the estimates and called Dakar about news from flight AF-447 asking,
whether the airplane was already under Cape Verde Control, to which Dakar replied «Yes, no worry.»
At 04:11Z Dakar Control had asked flight AF-459 to contact AF-447. By 04:18Z AF-459 asked Air France Dispatch to contact
AF-447. At 4:24Z Air France sent an ACARS message to AF-447.
At 05:50Z after several unsuccessful attempts to establish contact with AF-447 Air France contacted the Search and Rescue
Satellite Aided Tracking center, but no emergency beacon had been registered.
At 06:13Z Brest Center contacted by Air France and coordinating first attempts to locate the airplane said, that according to an
indirect source that had not been validated flight AF-447 had been in contact with Moroccan ATC.
At 06:35Z Madrid Center told Brest, that flight AF-447 was in touch with Casablanca and would enter Lisbon control zone
within 15 minutes.
At 06:44Z Air France Dispatch established, that Casablanca was not in touch with AF-447, but AF-459.
After verifying with a number of control centers Brest raised alert at 08:15Z.
Following 25 ACARS Messages were received from the airplane:
2:10:10
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
221002006
AUTO FLT AP OFF
2:10:16
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
226201006
AUTO FLT REAC W/S DET FAULT
2:10:23
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
279100506
F/CTL ALTN LAW
2:10:29
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
228300206
FLAG ON CAPT PFD SPD LIMIT
2:10:34 #0210/+2.98-30.59
2:10:41
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
228301206
FLAG ON F/O PFD SPD LIMIT
2:10:47
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
223002506
AUTO FLT A/THR OFF
2:10:54
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
344300506
NAV TCAS FAULT
2:11:00
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
228300106
FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD
2:11:15
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
228301106
FLAG ON F/O PFD FD
2:11:21
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
272302006
F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT
2:11:27
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
279045506
MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 2
2:11:42
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010210
279045006
MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 1
2:11:49
–
.1/FLR/FR0906010210 34111506 EFCS2 1,EFCS1,AFS,,,,,PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 / 1X3 (9DA),HARD
2:11:55
–
.1/FLR/FR0906010210 27933406
EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,,FCPC2 (2CE2) /WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO
FCPC2,HARD
2:12:10
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010211
341200106
FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV
2:12:16
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010211
341201106
FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV
2:12:51
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010212
341040006
NAV ADR DISAGREE
2:13:8 – .1/FLR/FR0906010211 34220006 ISIS 1,,,,,,,ISIS(22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION,HARD
2:13:14
–
.1/FLR/FR0906010211 34123406 IR2 1,EFCS1X,IR1,IR3,,,,ADIRU2 (1FP2),HARD
2:13:45
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010213
279002506
F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT
2:13:51
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010213
279004006
F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT
2:14:14
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010214
341036006
MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR 2
2:14:20
–
.1/FLR/FR0906010213 22833406 AFS 1,,,,,,,FMGEC1(1CA1),INTERMITTENT
2:14:26
–
.1/WRN/WN0906010214
213100206
ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED
The position report was timestamped at 02:10:34Z between two maintenance messages.
The message protocol required, that the airplane’s ACARS system requested communication, got assigned a channel,
transmitted the data, awaited acknowledgement (after the data were transmitted from the satellite to the ground station) and
closed down the communication for each message. The messages therefore arrived with a spacing of at least 5-6 seconds.
No satellite phone communications were registered from the aircraft.
The fault message «PROBE PITOT 1+2 / 2+3 / 1+3 (9DA)» means, that a speed decrease of more than 30 knots was detected
within one second. The three air data units were considered valid at that time.
The fault message «FCPC2(2CE2)/WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2» indicates, that the information provided by ADR1
via bus 2 is no longer considered valid by the primary flight controls computer 2, the code indicating, that the other primary
flight control computers had not detected that fault according to the ATA code 27 (otherwise ATA code 34 would follow). This
message has not yet been explained.
The fault message «ISIS (22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION» indicates, that there had been an internal failure of the
calibrated air speed or mach computation, or calibrated air speed or mach were outside certain limits.
The fault message «ADIRU2 (1FP2)» has not yet been explained.
The fault message «FMGEC1 (1CA1) (2 h 13)» has not yet been explained.
The warning messages indicate, that various monitoring processes have been triggered, at least one of them related to air
speed measurement inconsistency.
The cockpit effect messages mean:
– AUTO FLT AP OFF: The autopilot disconnected without crew intervention
– AUTO FLT REAC W/S DET FAULT: windshear detection is unavailable
– F/CTL ALTN LAW: FBW switched into alternate law (protections lost)
– FLAG ON CAPT PFD SPD LIM and FLAG ON F/O PFD SPD LIM: characteristic speeds (green dot, VLS, …) lost due to loss
of calculating function
– AUTO FLT A/THR OFF: Autothrottle disconnected other than by crew intervention or throttle levers were moved into the idle
notch
– NAV TCAS FAULT: TCAS is inoperative, the message has not yet been explained
– FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD and FLAG ON F/O PFD FD: flight director bars have been removed from primary flight displays
– F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT: The rudder limiter value computation is unavailable, the rudder remains limited to the present
values until slat extension
– MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS2 and MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS1: not brought to the crew attention
– FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV and FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV: flight path vector displays removed from the primary flight displays,
red flags shown instead
– NAV ADR DISAGREE: Computers have rejected one ADR and then detected a disagreement between the remaining ADRs
on one of the monitored paramenters.
– F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT: Primary Flight Controls Computer 1 has stopped functioning either as result of a command or failure
– F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT: Secondary Flight Controls Computer 1 has stopped functioning either as result of a command or
failure.
– MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR2: not brought to crew attention
– ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED: cabin pressure changes at a rate of 1800 feet/minute or greater for 5 seconds.
Visual inspection of the recovered debris showed, that the tail fin broke during a forward motion with a slight twist to the left.
The galley recovered and identified as G2 was basically intact, but baskets and racks were compressed in the lower part of
both galley carts. A toilet door showed evidence of great compression force. The floor of the crew rest module was bent
upwards under the effect of a strong upward pressure from below, the connecting brackets between floor and wall were bent
backwards.
The BEA concludes the analysis: «Observations of the tail fin and on the parts from the passenger (galley, toilet door, crew rest
module) showed that the airplane had likely struck the surface of the water in a straight line, with a high rate vertical
acceleration.»
The bodies of about 30 victims recovered were all clothed and relatively well preserved. At this time of the investigation the
BEA still did not have access to the autopsy results, the report states (English version, end of page 37).
The BEA has concluded their press conference introducing the results of their investigation and their preliminary report so far.
The key sentences have been (according to simultaneous English translation by BEA):
– No technical problems with the airplane before the takeoff.
– The airplane did NOT break up in flight.
– The 24 ACARS messages refer to the loss of airspeed (pitot tubes)
– The airplane also lost information about the direction the airplane was going to.
– The airplane hit the ocean in a flat attitude at high vertical speed.
– Weather was a classic ITZ scenario.
Nothing had been found before June 6th, then the first bodies and parts have been found. Parts from the nose to the tail of the
airplane have been found including parts of the structural body of the airplane, one part of the engine and parts of the main
cabin have been recovered. No clothes have been found, recovered life vests were not inflated. 51 bodies were recovered.
One of the cockpit walls has been found deformed. A large part of the crew rest room has been found, impact marks indicating
that something came from the bottom up to the top. The debris recovered so far suggests, that the airplane did not break up in
flight, but went down vertically.
Three other flights (IB-6024 [A343, Rio De Janeiro GIG-Madrid MAD 12 minutes behind AF-447], LH-507 [B744, Sao Paulo
GRU-Frankfurt FRA] 20 minutes behind AF-447, AF-459 [A332, Sao Paulo GRU-Paris CDG 37 minutes behind AF-447])
tracked the same route to TASIL between FL350 and FL370 around the time of the crash. They all had to avoid storm cells
and diverted from the airway between 11 and 80nm. They experienced moderate turbulence. All three flights had problems to
establish communication with Dakar. There were no satellite phone conversations from those crews.
The weather in the Intertropical Convergence Zone was a classic scenario with storm cells.
The airplane had started the engines at 22:10Z and got airborne at 22:29Z. Last radio communication was at 01:35Z. No
transfer had been completed from Rio’s control to Dakar control. An attempt by the AF-447 crew to establish contact with Dakar
Control has been detected at 02:01Z (the wording to the means of communication was unclear, supposedly it was a digital data
transmission via ACARS). No distress call was detected.
First alerts were sent at around 8:30 (unclear whether GMT, local Europe, local Brazil).
The BEA refuses to believe, the black boxes would not be found, however stated, that the search for the recorders will be
terminated on July 10th.
The Original BEA English translation said: The airplane went down vertically, a review of French wording offers a different
picture however stating, that the airplane came down in a flat attitude at high vertical speed.
The full preliminary report has just been published: French Version (13MB) and English Version (3MB).
By Simon Hradecky, created Saturday, Jun 6th 2009 17:46Z, last updated Thursday, Jul 2nd 2009 19:12Z
Forca Aerea Brasileira (FAB) have announced today (Jun
6th), that they have found two male bodies today as well
as a blue chair (serial number 23701103B331-0 not yet
confirmed to be part of F-GZCP), a bag with a vaccination
card and a leather briefcase, which contained a ticket for
flight AF-447 and a laptop. The bodies and debris were
found about 1200km off the coast of mainland Brazil and
about 69.5km northwest of the airplane’s last ACARS
position report.
Air France confirmed the ticket number to be a valid ticket
for flight AF-447.
Later the day around 16:00 local the Hercules C-130
spotted another debris field (most interesting find see
photo) west of the location, where the two bodies had
been found.
Two ships are collecting the debris located so far. The
search operation however has still priority to find the other
226 people over locating/recovering debris. Each new find
so far has reinforced the need to expand the search area,
that already spans more than 200,000 square kilometers
(almost the size of the United Kingdom).
Air France said, that Airbus Industries had issued a recommendation to retrofit the pitot tubes in September 2007, giving the
operators full freedom to decide about the implementation of the recommendation. Air France had implemented the
recommendation to their A320 fleet, but did not retrofit the long range A330s and A340s due to the absence of incidents.
Starting May 2008 Air France however observed the loss of air data on their A330 and A340 fleet. These incidents were
discussed with Airbus Industries, who identified the problems as icing related and suggested that the modification implemented
on the A320 would not resolve the icing issue. In the first quarter of 2009 laboratory tests however proved, that the new pitot
tube design establishes a significant improvement over the previous design. Following a test flight Air France began to
implement the retrofit of the new design pitot tubes onto their A330 and A340 fleet on April 27th 2009. Without prejudice Air
France has now decided to accelerate that program to retrofit the pitot tubes on the A330/A340 fleet.
On June 11th Air France added, that the necessary spare parts arrived on May 29th (two days prior to the crash) and the
replacement program commenced that day. Airbus Industries and EASA maintain, that the operation of aircraft is safe with all
types of pitot tubes.
Air France reported on Jun 25th, that two crew members have been identified amongst the human remains recovered from the
Atlantic: the captain of the flight and a flight attendant.
The FAB reported on Jun 26th, that they have ended the search operation for human remains and debris. A total of more than
600 pieces of debris as well as 51 mortal remains have been recovered, the FAB preferring to use the term «remains» over
«bodies» due to the condition of the bodies. The last remains were discovered on Jun 17th with no new sightings since. More
than 2 million square kilometers have been searched, 1612 people, 12 aircraft and 11 ships were involved in the search. The
crews, navy command and FAB offer their reverence to all victims and their families.
The FAB reported on Jun 23rd, that Senegalese Authorities have ended their participation in the search operation and have
withdrawn their vessels and search airplanes. The FAB is continuing the search including areas in Senegalese airspace
(following earlier agreements with Senegal permitting operation of Brasilian airplanes and vessels in the search area).
The Task Force consisting of Federal Police and the Department of Social Defense reported on Jun 21st, that 11 of the 49
victims brought to Recife so far (one still on the way to Recife), have been identified. 10 of the 11 are Brasilians. Search
efforts are in the process of being reduced, one of the search airplanes employed since June 1st has been withdrawn from the
operation.
Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Jun 1st 2009, aircraft impacted ocean 06/04/11 20:40
http://avherald.com/h?article=41a81ef1/0053&opt=0 Página 15 de 32
The French BEA in charge of the investigation into the crash reported, that they did not yet receive results of the autopsies
from the Brasilian Authorities nor were their medical staff permitted to participate in the autopsies. Brasilian Authorities are in
charge of the search and recovery operation. The Brasilian Task Force responded, that participants from France must be
properly accredited through diplomatic channels, four French personnel have already been accredited on Jun 10th as
observers into the work.
There is no official or independent verification for the Jun 23rd report of a single French newspaper fueling a media hysteria at
the moment, that weak signals of the black boxes may have been heard. Neither the French Marine, BEA nor Brasilian
Authorities confirm (Jun 23rd 09:00Z), that any signals have been heard. The BEA actually denied, that any signals of the
black boxes have yet been heard so far. Many signals had been heard during the search so far and were investigated, but did
not originate from the black boxes. A spokesman for the French government said (Jun 23rd 9:20Z), that no signals have been
received.
The Federal Police as well as the Department of Social Defense in Pernambuco said on Jun 14th, that the condition of the
bodies does not allow any visual identification by relatives. The necessary correction from 44 to 43 bodies recovered is due to
the fact, that one of remains had to be identified as coming from a large marine animal rather than a human. Scientific
examinations of the remains are underway to determine the identity of the remains and the possible causes of the accident.
The proceedings follow international standards – as of current there is no prediction when the examination of the mortal
remains will be concluded.
The FAB said on Jun 13th, that a merchant ship «Gammagas» on the route from Uruguay to the United Kingdom discovered
and recovered the rugged structure of the aircraft about 415km northwest of St. Peter and Paul.
The FAB reported on Jun 10th, that the worsening weather did not impact the recovery operations although search planes
were directed at other routes with more favourable weather conditions. The French submarine «Emeraude» and the French
helicopter carrier and command ship «Mistral» have arrived at the search area. After taking specialist sonar and sensor
equipment from the US on board both ships will start the search for the black boxes.
Airbus Industries said in an internal e-mail leaked to the public, that there is no evidence of any electrical failure as had been
initially claimed by Air France, no evidence of loss of flight instrument displays and no evidence of an ADIRU malfunction as
had happened in the Qantas incidents (Qantas uses a different ADIRU manufacturer than Air France). The ACARS messages
as available all indicate unreliable airspeed, although some messages suggest further aircraft evolution and/or crew actions.
The last message (cabin vertical speed) indicates a loss of cabin pressure at a rate greater than 1800 feet per minute, which
remains to be explained. 3 types of pitot tubes are available, 2 from Thales (BA and AA/Standard) as well as one from
Goodrich. The standard Thales pitot tube AA was used on Air France’s A330 F-GZCP. The BA type was developed to
enhance water drainage encountered during heavy rain conditions during takeoff or landing.
According to the French pilots’ union Air France have agreed to dispatch A330 and A340 aircraft only with at least two of the
three pitot tubes retrofitted with the new type starting coming Tuesday (Jun 9th).
A number of images have appeared on the Internet claiming, that a memory stick has been found containing photos of
onboard scenes. All of those images are fake and had been used in a TV series. Images claiming to be of AF-447 being
spammed via e-mail are not just fake, but do contain malicious code executing without user intervention according to Internet
Security firms.
The limitations of onboard weather radar systems in detecting weather systems and areas of turbulence are shown by an
English accident report by the Hong Kong Transportation Safety Board (HTSB) into in inflight upset of a Dragon Airlines
Airbus A330-300, registration B-HYA performing flight KA-60 from Kota Kinabalu (Malaysia) to Hong Kong (China) with 236
passengers and 14 crew, which encountered severe turbulence while cruising at FL410 and deviating from the airway due to
weather returns on the airborne weather radar. All 12 cabin crew and 3 passengers received injuries in the upset. The HTSB
concluded, that the airplane flew inadvertently into a zone of turbulent weather caused by strong convective activity associated
with a tropical depression. Based on the way of how the weather radar was operated, it was highly probable, that the crew
was not presented with an optimal image to enable full appreciation of the intensity and extent weather. As a result, the
deviation was not initiated early enough nor large enough to avoid the weather. The decisive parapgraph 2.2.2 reads:
Weather radar detects droplets of precipitation. The strength of the return depends on the size, composition and amount of
droplets. Water particles are almost five times more radar reflective than ice particles of the same size. Weather radar is
therefore effective in detecting rainfall and wet hail but not effective in detecting the upper level of a storm cell where most
moisture exists in a dry, frozen state, i.e. in the forms of snow, ice crystals and hail. To determine the positions of storm cells,
the antenna tilt angle should be adjusted to scan the icing level, where reflective water-covered ice/hail would be abundant.
Above the icing level, ice crystals have minimal radar reflectivity. Although convective activities and turbulence exist at these
levels, they do not show up readily on radar. To keep track of weather in the vicinity of the flight path, the antenna tilt angle
should be frequently adjusted to scan the most reflective area in the icing level band. As altitude changes or as the aircraft
gets closer to the storm cell, the tilt angle has to be changed so that the radar beam keeps scanning the most radar reflective
area.
To allow comparism of the images of the tails The Aviation Herald posts two pictures of the tail fin of the American Airlines
Airbus A300-600 registration N14053, that crashed at Belle Harbour near New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport on Nov 12th
2001 shortly after takeoff, when the airplane went through wake turbulence. The NTSB concluded in their final report, that
unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs caused the rudder and tail fin to separate from the aircraft causing the crash.
In the report the NTSB stated, that «the entire rudder separated from the vertical stabilizer except for portions of the rudder
spar structure that remained attached to hinge arm assembly numbers 2,3,4,5 and 7» (first sentence on page 52/last paragraph
of chapter 1.2.12). However, the pictures of the vertical tail of Air France show the rudder still attached to the vertical stabilizer
(fin). This is a very decisive difference disallowing any comparism of the accidents without further research and additional
facts.
Forca Aerea Brasileira (FAB) have confirmed in a press
release, that one of the Hercules C-130 search airplanes
sighted metallic and non-metallic debris on the ocean
surface about 650km northnortheast of Fernando de
Noronha Island at around 09:49Z. Two locations, about
60km apart have been identified.
The debris has been identified as an airplane seat, small
white pieces, an orange ball, a drum and traces of oil and
kerosene.
The Brasilian government now assumes, that these parts
belonged to the Air France Airbus and confirms the crash.
The FAB announced, that the crash will be investigated
under the lead of the French BEA with the support by
Brazil’s CENIPA (Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de
Acidentes Aeronáuticos, Center for Investigation and
Prevention of Aviation Accidents).
The BEA said, 20 investigators supported by 30 engineers
from Air France and Airbus Industries have started to
collect evidence. A team has been sent to Brazil to secure
and analyse recordings of air traffic control frequencies and other evidence in Brazil.
The NTSB said, they have accepted an invitation by the BEA to assist in the investigation and have dispatched Bill English as
their representative joined by engineers from the FAA, General Electrics (manufacturer of the CF6 engines) and Honeywell.
On Jun 4th the FAB announced, that they have found debris around 510km northnortheast of Fernando de Noronha. A cargo
pallet of about 2.5 square meters and two buoys were recovered. Seven hours later the FAB however had to report, that the
recovered debris did not belong to the Air France Airbus.
The BEA announced on June 5th, that so far only these facts have been verified:
– location near the planned route over the Atlantic in the vicinity of significant convective cells characteristic for the equatorial
region
– from start of the automatic message transmissions the reported measured speeds were inconsistent.
Airbus Industries reminded all operators of Airbus Aircraft series A300 to A380 of the operational, abnormal and emergency
procedures in the relevant Flight Crew Operation Manuals and Quick Reference Manuals regarding flying with unreliable
airspeed.
A press conference of BEA on June 6th confirmed, that a total of 24 ACARS messages, 14 within the first minute at 02:10Z,
indicating system faults, arrived from the airplane. The message show inconsistencies in the air speeds measured by the three
pitot systems of the aircraft rendering the air speed indications unreliable. The BEA however cautioned, that those messages
don’t say anything about the causes and are not meant as a tool to aid investigations, but mainly reflect the system status and
don’t tell anything about the why. Although it appears probable, that the messages and the loss of the airplane are related,
there is no confirmation of a casual link between the two events. Weather experts of Meteo France said, that the weather
development on June 1st (UTC) within the InterTropical Convergence Zone was normal with no anomalies, there was no
evidence, that AF-447 encountered a storm of extraordinary intensity. Weather developments were more intense in the days
surrounding the accident day.
In the press conference the BEA said, that three methodes of finding the black boxes are currently employed: two ships have
been equipped with acoustic equipment from the USA to be able to detect the 160dB(A) signal from the black boxes assumed
to be at 4600 meters depth of the ocean. Another «ordinary warship» is tracking the area as well as a nuclear submarine.
BEA also said, that Airbus Industries had already recommended a retrofit of the pitot tubes of the airplane, F-GZCP however
had not yet received that new design pitot tubes. Air France is still in the process of replacing the pitot tubes on all their
aircraft.
A passenger on board of a TAM Linhas Aereas Airbus A330-200 registration PT-MVH performing flight JJ-8098 from Sao
Paulo Guarulhos (Brazil) to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) bound to land in Paris about 40 minutes past AF-447 reported,
that they were about 4 hours into their flight, when the airplane experienced severe turbulence and began to violently shake.
The pilots performed an emergency descent to get into calmer air. Only after about 30 minutes the turbulence ended.
Subsequently the airplane reached Paris without further incident.
More details of the ACARS messages have become available on June 5th and suggest following events while the airplane
was in cruise (note, there is no message regarding electrics, hydraulics or engine problems):
02:10Z: Autothrust off
Autopilot off
FBW alternate law
Rudder Travel Limiter Fault
TCAS fault due to antenna fault
Flight Envelope Computation warning
All pitot static ports lost
02:11Z: Failure of all three ADIRUs
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost)
02:12Z: ADIRUs Air Data disagree
02:13Z: Flight Management, Guidance and Envelope Computer fault
PRIM 1 fault
SEC 1 fault
02:14Z: Cabin Pressure Controller fault (cabin vertical speed)
There have been at least two similiar incidents preceding AF-447 (dates of both flights are unknown):
First incident: An Air France Airbus A340-300, registration F-GLZL performing flight AF-279 from Tokyo Narita (Japan) to Paris
Charles de Gaulle (France), was enroute at FL310, when the airplane went through a line of thunderstorms. The captain’s air
speed indication suddenly dropped to 140 knots, the systems issued an alert regarding disagreeing speeds (NAV IAS
DISCREPANCY), the navigation display showed a tail wind component of 250 knots. The captain released control of the
airplane to the first officer and tried to switch his display from ADIRU1 to ADIRU3. 2 minutes later autopilot and autothrust
disconnected and the fly by wire changed into alternate law. The crew noticed icing conditions (static air temperature [SAT] -29
degrees Centigrade) and switched anti ice including pitot heating systems from automatic to on. The speed indications became
normal again and agreed again, the autoflight systems were reengaged and ATC informed of severe icing. ATC reported, that
two flights had just passed the location without problems. When the crew attempted to reset and reengage ADIRU 1 two
times, the system again brought the message «NAV IAS DISCREPANCY» on both attempts, although the speed data
appeared consistent. The crew suspected polluted pitot tubes.
Maintenance found, that the drainage holes of all three pitot tubes had been clogged, rendering it very likely that weather
combined with the clogged drainage holes caused the incident. Maintenance had reported more clogged drainage holes on
A330 and A340 aircraft in the past to Airbus Industries. Airbus Industries was aware of the problems, changes had already
been introduced to the pitot tubes on the A320 family, where similiar problems had occured. A modification of the A330/A340
pitot tubes was already planned by AI.
Second incident: An Air France Airbus A340-300, registration F-GLZN performing a flight from Paris Charles de Gaulle
(France) to New York JFK,NY (USA), encountered brief turbulence while enroute. The autoflight systems dropped offline, «NAV
IAS DISCREPANCY», «NAV PRED W/S DET FAULT» and stall alerts were repeatedly issued during the following two minutes.
The airplane continued to JFK without further incident. A review of the policy of retrofitting pitot tubes was recommended and
authorities informed.
Aerial shot of the oil spill (Photo: FAB):
An Air France Airbus A330-200 (CF6-80E engines), registration F-GZCP performing flight AF-447 (dep May 31st) from Rio de
Janeiro,RJ (Brazil) to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) with 216 passengers and 12 crew, is overdue at Paris Charles de
Gaulle for more than three hours following a scheduled 11:15 hours flight time and estimated arrival at 11:10 CEST (09:10Z).
The airplane had departed Brazil’s civil radar coverage normally.
A crisis and intervention center has been setup at Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport.
Brazil has launched a search and rescue operation off their coast along the last known radar positions near the Island of
Fernando de Noronha after which the airplane had failed to establish required radio communication.
There have been no reports of an unscheduled landing anywhere on Atlantic Islands or airports surrounding the Atlantic.
French Authorities report, that the airplane would have run out of fuel by now.
According to Forca Aerea Brasileira (FAB) the last radio contact with the crew was about 3 hours into the flight at around
01:33Z. The crew reported flying through severe turbulence. The airplane left civil radar coverage at 01:48Z at FL350 and was
expected to report next at 02:20Z. At 02:20Z the crew did not report their position as expected prompting Oceanic Control to
raise alert, also informing Dakar Air Traffic Control Center.
Air France reported, that they had received an automatic message from the airplane reporting an electrical short circuit and the
failure of multiple systems at 02:14Z. Air Traffic Control as well as Military Stations along the Atlantic coast of South America,
Africa, Portugal, Spain and France have been alerted and attempted to contact the airplane without success. Attempts to locate
the airplane using civil and military radars from both west and east coasts (including France) of the Atlantic also proved
unsuccessful. The airplane entered service in 2005 and had accumulated 18870 flights hours. The captain had 11700 flight
hours, one of the first officers had 3000, the other 6600 flight hours.
Sources within Air France reported, that the automatic message did not only report an electrical short circuit, but also the loss
of cabin pressure. This information has been confirmed by FAB, who also stated, that the position of the airplane was given as
N3.5777 W30.3744 in that message.
New information provided by sources within Air France suggests, that the ACARS messages of system failures started to arrive
at 02:10Z indicating, that the autopilot had disengaged and the fly by wire system had changed to alternate law. Between
02:11Z and 02:13Z a flurry of messages regarding ADIRU and ISIS faults arrived, at 02:13Z PRIM 1 and SEC 1 faults were
indicated, at 02:14Z the last message received was an advisory regarding cabin vertical speed. That sequence of messages
could not be independently verified.
Airbus Industries confirmed the loss of the airplane while still maintaining the status of the airplane officially as missing.
At 14:35Z Air France extended their sincere condolences to the family members of passengers and crew on board of the
airplane. Psychological assistance is available at Charles de Gaulle Airport in France as well as at the airport in Rio de Janeiro.
The French BEA (Bureau for Accident Investigation) have opened an investigation into the loss of the A330 joined by Airbus
Industries.
Air France has set up hotlines for family members at 0800 800 812 within France, 0800 881 20 20 within Brazil and +33 1 57
02 10 55 from other countries.
According to the FAB the airplane was tracking from waypoint INTOL to waypoint TASIL (entry point into Senegal airspace),
positions reports would have put the airplane approximately 450nm northnortheast of the Island of Fernando de Noronha and
right in the largest red zone on the infrared weather satellite image by NASA at 02:14Z. Weather Services said, that clouds
and severe turbulence reached up to 55000 feet in that area.
The FAB confirmed, that the pilot of a TAM Linhas Aereas flight from Europe to Brazil reported bright spots on the ocean
surface in Senegal’s airspace. Senegal conducted a search in that area including having the vessel «Douce France» combing
the area, the search however found no trace of the missing airplane. Earlier media reports had suggested, that the «Douce
France» had found debris of the airplane in the same area, in which the TAM pilot had spotted the bright spots.
Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Jun 1st 2009, aircraft impacted ocean 06/04/11 20:40
http://avherald.com/h?article=41a81ef1/0053&opt=0 Página 27 de 32
The United States have pledged support in the search of the missing airplane, especially satellite imagery and analysis thereof.
This marks the first loss of an Airbus A330 in commercial operation ever. Four hull losses of Airbus A330s had occured in noncommercial
flights.
The sequence of messages reportedly received via ACARS raises memories of the Accident: Qantas A333 near Learmonth
on Oct 7th 2008, sudden inflight upset injures 74 people on board and Incident: Qantas A333 near Perth on Dec 27th
2008, navigation system problem, and turns attention towards the emergency airworthiness directive released by both FAA
and EASA, see also EASA issues updated emergency directive regarding Airbus A330 and A340 ADIRU issues.
Term Explanation
Normal
Law:
Regular operating mode of the fly by wire (FBW) including all protections.
Alternate
Law:
Some of the protections in normal law, the regular operating mode, are dropped.
Direct
Law:
The controls (sidestick) inputs are converted into direct movements of control surfaces without computations or
checks.
ADIRU:
Air Data and Inertial Reference Unit provides air data (airspeed, altimeter, …) and positional data (attitude, position)
to the instruments
ISIS:
Integrated Standby Instrument System is a completely independent, self contained system providing a third
independent set of basic instruments (attitude indicator, altimeter, airspeed indicator) to the crew
PRIM 1:
Flight Control primary computer #1, three of them monitor each other, one of them controls the control surfaces as
master
SEC 1:
Flight Control secondary computer #1, each of the two can control all airplane control surfaces in direct law and can
become master in case of failure of all primary flight control computers.